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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to 
review final agency actions, orders, or decrees which are the 
result of formal adjudicative proceedings through Utah Code 
Annotated 63-46B-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Personnel Review 
Board. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Is the Personnel Review Board precluded from reversing 
a Step 5 decision based upon its own new findings of fact? 
II. May the Personnel Review Board impose its own penalty 
which is greater than that which the agency is allowed to impose? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Paul S. Sucher ("Sucher") accepts as accurate the 
statement of the case as presented by Appellant Utah Department of 
Corrections, Utah State Prison ("Agency") with the addition of the 
fact that the Personnel Review Board (the "PRB") accepted the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the hearing officer as 
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far as they went, but the PRB made additional findings of fact 
before overturning the Step 5 decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Sucher accepts as accurate the statement of facts 
as presented by Appellant Agency with the following exceptions and 
additions: 
1. Appellant Sucher swung at inmate Greg Loya ("Loya") as 
a result of the subjective fear that he was being assaulted with 
a deadly weapon; namely AIDS infected saliva; 
2. In addition to reinstating Sucher, the PRB made the 
additional Finding of Fact that the Agency had not provided Sucher 
with any instruction regarding AIDS and any dangers of contracting 
it through his job. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The role of the PRB is to be an appellate review 
body. It is to determine whether there is substantial evidence 
presented by the Agency to justify the disciplinary action taken. 
In performing this function, the PRB is empowered, upon examining 
the record as a whole, to make additional findings of fact. The 
PRB did make additional findings of fact upon which it based its 
reversal of the Agency's termination of Sucher. The PRB agreed 
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with the Step 5 finding that Sucher had a subjective fear that he 
might contract AIDS through the contact of infected saliva with his 
skin. Based upon this finding, the PRB correctly felt it relevant 
to find, as a matter of fact, that the Agency had offered no AIDS 
related training to Sucher. 
POINT II: Although the PRB has the authority to make 
additional Findings of Fact and thereby reverse the Agency's 
decision, it does not have the authority to create its own 
penalties which have no basis in law or rule. The PRB stated that 
the Agency's discipline of Sucher was excessive and reinstated him 
according to its authority; however, beyond this, the PRB cannot 
create its own penalty. Hence, the reinstatement should stand, but 
the 15 month suspension without pay or benefits should not. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRB APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW IN REVERSING THE STEP 5 DECISION 
A. THE PRB OVERTURNED THE STEP 5 DECISION SINCE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR HAD OCCURRED IN THAT RELEVANT 
FACTORS HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED. 
The Agency contends that the PRB arbitrarily and capriciously 
exercised its own judgment in reinstating Sucher. To the contrary, 
the PRB simply corrected the oversight of the Step 5 hearing 
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officer by making an additional and determinative Finding of Fact 
which the hearing officer should have i&ade. In substantial part, 
Rule 26.8.2 of the Grievance Procedure Rules (1987) provides, 
The Board's standards of review consist of determining: 
(1) whether the hearing officer's ... decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; (2) whether that 
decision is warranted by the facts and circumstances . . . 
(3) whsrther the hearing officer's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are correct . . . based on the evidence. 
By virtue of this rule, the PRB is empowered to make its 
findings and add them to or replace the findings of the hearing 
officer when the record indicates an error. Case law and 
administrative law principles are in harmony with this position. 
In Starrett v. Special Council, 792 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1986) 
the Fourth Circuit addressed the argument that the Merit System 
Protection Board had exceeded its authority by not accepting the 
decision of the administrative law judge and instead making its own 
findings. The court stated 
Under administrative law principles, as agency or board 
is free either to adopt or reject an ALJ's findings and 
conclusion of law . . . The . . . board retains the power to 
rule on disputed facts[.] 
Id. at 1252. See, also 3K. Davis Administrative Law Treatise, 
Section 17.17 (2d ed. 1980). 
Additionally, Judge Russon stated in his memorandum decision 
in Ron v. Office of Community Operations, (C-86-3311), which was 
a district court appeal from a PRB decision, that the pertinent 
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statutes and rules authorize the PRB to "review the record, receive 
additional information, make findings of fact, and make its 
decision based thereon." Id. at 3, 4. In short, neither the 
findings of the Agency, nor those of the hearing officer are 
necessarily conclusive on the board. 
In the case at bar, the hearing officer was presented with 
evidence that Sucher feared for his life when he was spit upon by 
Loya. The hearing officer accepted Sucher's expressed fear as 
genuine. (Hearing Officer Decision p. 11.) The hearing officer, 
however, labeled Sucher's fear as subjective and did not address 
the matter further. The PRB apparently felt it relevant to explore 
the source of Sucher's subjective fear of AIDS infection. The 
source of that fear appeared to be lack of education. Since the 
underlying cause of Sucher's actions was his fear of AIDS 
infection, the fear and its source are certainly relevant. 
The United States Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) has held that 
failure to consider relevant factors in an administrative hearing 
is arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 43. Pursuant to 67-19-
25(6), Utah Code Ann. (1987) as amended), the PRB may review the 
decisions of the hearing officer "Based on incorrect or arbitrary 
interpretation of facts." 
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In the case at bar, as stated above, the hearing officer 
failed to consider the very relevant factor that Sucher had 
received no training concerning AIDS from the Agency. The Agency 
had, in fact, offered no training even though there had been 
considerable concern expressed by many employees of the Agency. 
(Hearing Officer Decision p. 10.) Not only had there been no 
training concerning AIDS, the Agency sent mixed signals concerning 
the disease. The Agency had issued a memorandum concerning AIDS 
in which it stated there was no evidence AIDS was spread through 
saliva, yet the same memorandum cautioned against sharing 
toothbrushes or cigarettes. (Hearing Officer Decision p. 10.) 
The fact that the PRB made an additional Finding of Fact that 
the Agency had offered no AIDS education indicates that it 
recognized the relevance of the fact. Admittedly, the fact that 
the PRB accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact as accurate 
and properly applied to the law could cause some confusion as to 
why the PRB overturned the Step 5 decision. However, there is no 
contradiction in this. The hearing officer's findings and 
conclusions were accurate — as far as they went, but they were 
incomplete. The PRB evidently, upon considering the source of 
Sucher's fear of AIDS, which was the underlying cause of his 
actions, found that to be a sufficiently relevant factor to 
overturn the hearing officer's decision. In short, the Step 5 
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decision was not "warranted by the facts and circumstances of the 
case on appeal." Rule 26.8.2 of Grievance Procedure Rules (1987). 
B. THE PRB'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONCLUSIVE ON 
APPEAL TO THIS COURT IF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
This court is much more limited in its review of the PRB's 
action than is the PRB in its review of the Agency action. The 
provisions of 67-19-25(7), Utah Code Ann. (1987, as amended) 
state 
On appeal to the district court, [court of appeals] the 
board's findings of fact, if supported by substantial 
evidence, shall be conclusive. (Emphasis added) 
In accordance with the above cited statute, this court must 
limit its review to the actions of the PRB and not those of the 
hearing officer. In Board of Education of Sevier Co. School 
District v. The Board of Review of the Department of Employment 
Security, et ah, 701 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1985) the state supreme court 
held that the review board's decision must be affirmed "unless as 
a matter of law, the determination was wrong because only the 
opposite conclusion could be drawn from the facts." JId. at 1067-
68. This is also the position of the Fourth Circuit. In Starrett 
v. Special Council, supra, that court stated, "As a reviewing court 
we review the decision of the MSPB, not that of the ALJ." id. at 
1252. The MSPB is the federal counter part to the PRB. 
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Utah courts have continually supported the position that 
before courts can overturn a board decision, they must meet a 
stringent substantial evidence standard« In Oaden Standard 
Examiner v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983) 
the Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing a decision of the Utah 
Industrial Commission held that "[The] inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are arbitrary and capricious or wholly 
without cause or contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the 
evidence or without any substantial evidence to support them" Id, 
at 88 (Emphasis added). Additionally, in Kennecott v. Department 
of Employment Security, 372 P.2d 987 (Utah 1962 the Supreme Court 
stated 
We are obliged to analyze this determination in 
accordance with the established rules of review; that the 
evidence is to be looked at in the light most favorable 
to the findings; and in so doing, if there is evidence 
of any substance whatever which can reasonably be 
regarded as supporting the determination made, it must 
be affirmed; 
Id, at 989 (Emphasis added). See, also Sabo's Electronic Service 
v, Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982). 
In light of the above cited cases and statutes, it appears 
this court is faced with performing a two-pronged test. First, the 
court must look at the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
PRB's findings. Second, in order to overturn the PRB's decision, 
this court must determine that the PRB's decision is completely 
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without support in the evidence. If this court doesn't find a 
complete lack of evidentiary support for the PRB's decision while 
examining the evidence in the favorable light, 67-19-25(7), Utah 
Code Ann. (1987, as amended), as well as the Kennecott holding 
mandate that this court affirm the decision of the PRB. 
POINT II 
THE 15 MONTH SUSPENSION IMPOSED BY THE PRB 
IS CONTRARY TO UTAH RULES AND STATUTES 
AND BEYOND THE PRB'S AUTHORITY 
The PRB was completely within its authority to reinstate 
Sucher and correctly did so. However, the PRB also imposed a 15 
month suspension without pay or benefits upon Sucher. Such a 
penalty is not permissible under the relevant Utah statutes and 
rules. The PRB, in this instance, abused its discretion and this 
portion of its decision should be reversed. 
The Personnel Management Rules sheds some light on the nature 
of the penalties which can be imposed upon Sucher. Utah 
Administrative Code R20-ll-l(4) enumerates the disciplinary 
measures which may be imposed. These measures include: a written 
reprimand; suspension without pay for no more than 30 days; 
demotion, or dismissal. There is no provision allowing for a 15 
month suspension. The only suspension provided is one of no more 
than 30 days. Since these are the only penalties authorized by 
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rule or statute, and the PRB is admittedly created and bound by 
statute, there is no basis for the 15 month suspension imposed by 
the PRB. 
Although Utah Administrative Code, R665-1-26 .15.14 (1987-1988) 
gives the PRB the authority to reinstate Sucher in that it allows 
the PRB to "affirm, reverse, adopt, modify, supplement, amend or 
reject the Hearing Officer's Step 5 decision, ... or may make any 
other appropriate disposition of the appeal" it does not grant the 
PRB authority to create its own disciplinary measures. Such 
authority would allow the PRB to simply second guess the Agency and 
would make a sham of the appellate procedure. The PRB would, in 
essence, be not just legislating, but legislating in direct 
contradiction to the express will of the legislature which created 
the Utah Administrative Code and the Personnel Management Rules. 
As stated above, R20-11-1(4) expressly limits the disciplinary 
measures which may be imposed and a 15 month suspension is not 
included in that rule. 
In its appeal, the Agency cites two cases as authority 
requiring this court to reverse completely the decision of the PRB. 
In Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 145 P.2d 
792 (Utah 1944) the Civil Service Commission overturned the 
termination of a police officer. The Commission claimed authority 
to impose its own penalty and did so. The court reversed the 
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Commission's penalty but didn't expressly reverse the officer's 
reinstatement. The court simply clarified the law; i.e., the 
Commission may not create its own penalties, and remanded to the 
Commission. In the case at bar, the PRB made its own findings of 
fact to support Sucher's reinstatement. There is no reason to 
reverse the reinstatement. There are no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law to support the 15 month suspension. In fact, 
in this instance Vetterli is very instructive. The PRB, like the 
Commission in Vetterli, had no statutory authority, or any other 
authority through which to create its own penalty. The PRB's 
imposition of a 15 month penalty was ultra vires and that portion 
of its decision should be reversed. 
The other case cited by the Agency is Drovaldo v. Department 
of Public Safety, 255 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1977). In that case, the 
Police Civil Service Commission imposed a lesser penalty upon a 
police officer who had been terminated by the department head. The 
Commission's reduced penalty was overturned by the court. Again, 
Drovaldo is easily distinguished from the case at bar in so far as 
the Agency cites it as authority for reversing the PRB's entire 
decision. In the instant case, the PRB made separate findings of 
fact to support its reinstatement of Sucher. In Drovaldo, the 
Commission made no additional findings of fact to support its 
decision. Applying Drovaldo to the case at bar is only appropriate 
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when applied to the PRB's 15 month suspension. The PRB, like the 
Police Civil Service Commission, had no authority to create its own 
penalty. Applying Drovaldo to the PRB's reinstatement of Sucher 
is erroneous however. The PRB was completely within its authority 
to reinstate and correctly did so. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the PRB action is easily divided into two severable 
parts. It reinstated Sucher upon the strength of its additional 
findings of fact. Statutes, rules and case law support this 
action. The PRB also imposed a 15 month suspension upon Sucher. 
There are no statutes, rules or case law to support this action. 
However, there is no legal authority requiring the complete 
reversal of the PRB's decision. It is a simple matter to sever the 
decision just as occurs on a regular basis in appellate 
proceedings. It is common practice to reverse a lower court's 
decision in part only, while affirming the rest of the decision. 
Appellant Sucher asks this court to affirm his reinstatement 
as it is supported by substantial evidence and to sever the PRB 
imposed 15 month suspension as it is not supported by substantial 
evidence and the PRB abused its discretion in this regard. 
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L^Zane^Gill 
Attorney for Appellant 
Paul^S. Sucher 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of June 1989, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Stephen G. Schwendiman 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
17 
